The Court of Justice of the EU decided in Case C-210/16 Wirtschaftsakademie that Facebook and the administrator of a fan page created on Facebook are joint controllers under EU data protection law. The decision sent a mini shockwave to organizations that use Facebook Pages, just one week after the GDPR entered into force. What exactly does it mean that they are joint controllers and what exactly do they have to do in order to be compliant? The judgment leaves these questions largely unanswered, but it gives some clues as to finding answers.
Being a joint controller means they have a shared responsibility (with Facebook) to comply with EU data protection law for the processing of personal data occurring through their Facebook Page. As the Court highlighted, they have this responsibility even if they do not have access at all to personal data collected through cookies placed on the devices of visitors of the Facebook page, but just to the aggregated results of the data collection.
The judgment created a great deal of confusion. What has not been yet sufficiently emphasized in the reactions to the Wirtschaftsakademie judgment is that this shared responsibility is not equal: it depends on the stage of the processing the joint controller is involved in and on the actual control it has over the processing. This is, in any case, a better position to be in rather than “controller” on behalf of whom Facebook is processing personal data, or “co-controller” with Facebook. This would have meant full legal liability for complying with data protection obligations for the personal data processed through the page. It is, however, a worse position than being a third party or a recipient that is not involved in any way in establishing purposes and means of the processing. That would have meant there is no legal responsibility for the data being processed through the page. Technically, those were the other options the Court probably looked at before taking the “joint controllership” path.
It is important to note that the Court did not mention at all which are the responsibilities of whom – not even with regard to providing notice. The failure of both Facebook and the page administrator to inform visitors about cookies being placed on their device was the reason invoked by the DPA in the main national proceedings, but the Court remained silent on who is responsible for this obligation.
This summary looks at what the Court found, explaining why it reached its conclusion, and trying to carve out some of the practical consequences of the judgment (also in relation to the GDPR).
This first part of the commentary on the judgment will only cover the findings related to “joint controllership”. The findings related to the competence of the German DPA will be analyzed in a second part. While the judgment interprets Directive 95/46, most of the findings will remain relevant under the GDPR as well, to the extent they interpret identical or very similar provisions of the two laws.
Facts of the Case
Wirtschaftsakademie is an organization that offers educational services and has a Facebook fan page. The Court described that administrators of fan pages can obtain anonymous statistical information available to them free of charge. “That information is collected by means of evidence files (‘cookies’), each containing a unique user code, which are active for two years and are stored by Facebook on the hard disk of the computer or on other media of visitors to fan pages” (#15). The user code “is collected and processed when the fan pages are open” (#15).
The DPA of Schleswig-Holstein ordered Wirtschaftsakademie to close the fan page if it will not be brought to compliance, on the ground that “neither Wirtschaftsakademie, nor Facebook, informed visitors to the Fan Page that Facebook, by means of cookies, collected personal data concerning them and then processed the data” (#16).
The decision of the DPA was challenged by Wirtschaftsakademie, arguing that “it was not responsible under data protection law for the processing of the data by Facebook or the cookies which Facebook installed” (#16). After the DPA lost in lower instances, it appealed these solutions to the Federal Administrative Court, arguing that the main data protection law breach of Wirtschafstakademie was the fact that it commissioned “an inappropriate supplier” because the supplier “did not comply with data protection law” (#22).
The Federal Administrative Court sent several questions for a preliminary ruling to the CJEU aiming to clarify whether indeed Wirtschaftsakademie had any legal responsibility for the cookies placed by Facebook through its Fan Page and whether the Schleswig Holstein DPA had competence to enforce German data protection law against Facebook, considering that Facebook’s main establishment in the EU is in Ireland and its German presence is only linked to marketing (#24).
“High level of protection” and “effective and complete protection”
The Court starts its analysis by referring again to the aim of the Directive to “ensure a high level of protection of fundamental rights and freedoms, and in particular their right to privacy in respect to processing of personal data” (#26) – and it is to be expected that all analyses under the GDPR would start from the same point. This means that all interpretation of the general data protection law regime will be done in favor of protecting the fundamental rights of data subjects.
Based on the findings in Google Spain, the Court restates that “effective and complete protection of the persons concerned” requires a “broad definition of controller” (#28). Effective and complete protection is another criterion that the Court often takes into account when interpreting data protection law in favor of the individual and his or her rights.
{In fact, one of the afterthoughts of the Court after establishing the administrator is a joint controller, was that “the recognition of joint responsibility of the operator of the social network and the administrator of a fan page hosted on that network in relation to the processing of the personal data of visitors to that page contributes to ensuring more complete protection of the rights of persons visiting a fan page” (#42)}.
The referring Court did not even consider the possibility that the administrator is a controller
Having set up the stage like this, the Court goes on and analyzes the definition of “controller”. To be noted, though, that the referring Court never asked whether the administrator of the fan page is a controller or a joint controller, but asked whether it has any legal responsibility for failing to choose a compliant “operator of its information offering” while being an “entity that does not control the data processing within the meaning of Article 2(d) of Directive 95/46” (#24 question 1).
It seems that the referring Court did not even take into account that the fan page administrator would have any control over the data, but was wondering whether only “controllers” have legal responsibility to comply with data protection law under Directive 95/46, or whether other entities somehow involved in the processing could also have some responsibility.
However, the Court does not exclude the possibility that the administrator may be a controller. First of all, it establishes that processing of personal data is taking place, as described at #15, and that the processing has at least one controller.
Facebook is “primarily” establishing means and purposes of the processing
It recalls the definition of “controller” in Article 2(d) of the Directive and highlights that “the concept does not necessarily refer to a single entity and may concern several actors taking part in that processing, with each of them then being subject to the applicable data protection provisions” (#29). The distribution of responsibilities from the last part of the finding is brought up by the Court without having any such reference in Article 2(d)[1].
This is important, because the next finding of the Court is that, in the present case, “Facebook Ireland must be regarded as primarily determining the purposes and means of processing the personal data of users of Facebook and persons visiting the fan pages hosted on Facebook” (#30). Reading this paragraph together with #29 means that Facebook will have a bigger share of the obligations in a joint controllership situation with fan pages administrators.
This idea is underlined by the following paragraph which refers to identifying the “extent” to which a fan page administrator “contributes… to determining, jointly with Facebook Ireland and Facebook Inc., the purposes and means of processing” (#31). To answer this question, the Court lays out its arguments in three layers:
1) It describes the processing of personal data at issue, mapping the data flows – pointing to the personal data being processed, data subjects and all entities involved:
- The data processing at issue (placing of cookies on the Fan Page visitors’ device) is “essentially carried out by Facebook” (#33);
- Facebook “receives, registers and processes” the information stored in the placed cookies not only when a visitor visits the Fan Page, but also when he or she visits services provided by other Facebook family companies and by “other companies that use the Facebook services” (#33);
- Facebook partners and “even third parties” may use cookies to provide services to Facebook or the business that advertise on Facebook (#33);
- The creation of a fan page “involves the definition of parameters by the administrator, depending inter alia on the target audience … , which has an influence on the processing of personal data for the purpose of producing statistics based on visits to the fan page” (#36);
- The administrator can request the “processing of demographic data relating to its target audience, including trends in terms of age, sex, relationship and occupation”, lifestyle, location, online behavior, which tell the administrator where to make special offers and better target the information it offers (#37);
- The audience statistics compiled by Facebook are transmitted to the administrator “only in anonymized form” (#38);
- The production of the anonymous statistics “is based on the prior collection, by means of cookies installed by Facebook …, and the processing of personal data of (the fan page) visitors for such statistical purposes” (#38);
2) It identifies the purposes of this processing:
- There are two purposes of the processing:
- “to enable Facebook to improve its system of advertising transmitted via its network” and
- “to enable the fan page administrator to obtain statistics produced by Facebook from the visits of the page”, which is useful for “managing the promotion of its activity and making it aware of the profiles of the visitors who like its fan page or use its applications, so that it can offer them more relevant content” (#34);
3) It establishes a connection between the two entities that define the two purposes of processing:
- Creating a fan page “gives Facebook the opportunity to place cookies on the computer or other device of a person visiting its fan page, whether or not that person has a Facebook account” (#35);
- The administrator may “define the criteria in accordance with which the statistics are to be drawn up and even designate the categories of persons whose personal data is to be made use of by Facebook”, “with the help of filters made available by Facebook” (#36);
- Therefore, the administrator “contributes to the processing of the personal data of visitors to its page” (#36);
One key point: not all joint controllers must have access to the personal data being processed
In what is the most impactful finding of this judgment, the Court uses one of the old general principles of interpreting and applying the law, ubi lex non distinguit, nec nos distinguere debemus, and it states that “Directive 95/46 does not, where several operators are jointly responsible for the same processing, require each of them to have access to the personal data concerned” (#38). Therefore, the fact that administrators have access only to anonymized data will have no impact upon the existence of their legal responsibility as joint controllers, since the criteria that matters is establishing purposes and means of the processing and that at least one of the entities involved in the processing has access to and is processing personal data. The fact that they only have access to anonymized data should nonetheless matter when establishing the degree of responsibility.
Hence, after describing the involvement of fan page administrators in the processing at issue – and in particular their role in defining parameters for processing depending on their target audience and in the determination of the purposes of the processing, the Court finds that “the administrator must be categorized, in the present case, as a controller responsible for that processing within the European Union, jointly with Facebook Ireland” (#39).
Enhanced responsibility for non-users visiting the page
The Court also made the point that fan pages can be visited by non-users of Facebook, implying that were it not for the existence of that specific fan page they accessed because they were looking for information related to the administrator of the page, Facebook would not be able to place cookies on their devices and process personal data related to them for its own purposes and for the purposes of the fan page. “In that case, the fan page responsibility for the processing of the personal data of those persons appears to be even greater, as the mere consultation of the home page by visitors automatically starts the processing of their personal data” (#42).
Jointly responsible, not equally responsible
Finally, after establishing that there is joint controllership and joint responsibility, the Court makes the very important point that the responsibility is not equal and it depends on the degree of involvement of the joint controller in the processing activity:
“The existence of joint responsibility does not necessarily imply equal responsibility of the various operators involved in the processing of personal data. On the contrary, those operators may be involved at different stages of that processing of personal data and to different degrees, so that the level of responsibility of each of them must be assessed with regard to all the relevant circumstances of the particular case” (#43).
Comments and conclusions
In the present case, the Court found early in the judgment that Facebook “primarily” establishes the means and purposes of the processing. This means that it is primarily responsible for compliance with data protection obligations. At the same time, the administrator of the fan page has responsibility to comply with some data protection provisions, as joint controller. The Court did not clarify, however, what exactly the administrator of the fan page must do in order to be compliant.
For instance, the Court does not go into analyzing how the administrator complies or not with the Directive in this case – therefore, assuming that the judgment requires administrators to provide data protection notice is wrong. The lack of notice was a finding of the DPA in the initial proceedings. Moreover, the DPA ordered Wirtschaftsakademie to close its Facebook page because it found that neither Facebook, nor the page administrator had informed visitors about the cookies being placed on their devices (#16).
The CJEU merely establishes that the administrator is a joint controller and that it shares responsibility for compliance with Facebook depending on the degree of their involvement in the processing.
The only clear message from the Court with regard to the extent of legal responsibility of the administrator as joint controller is that it has enhanced responsibility towards visitors of the fan page that are not Facebook users. This being said, it is very likely that informing data subjects is one of the obligations of the GDPR that can potentially fall on the shoulders of fan page administrators in the absence of Facebook stepping up and providing notice, since they can edit the interface with visitors to a certain extent.
Another message that is not so clear, but can be extracted from the judgment is that the degree of responsibility of the joint controllers “must be assessed with regard to all the relevant circumstances of the particular case” (#43). This could mean that if the two joint controllers were to enter a joint controllership agreement (as the GDPR now requires), the Courts and DPAs may be called to actually look at the reality of the processing in order to determine the responsibilities each of them has, in order to avoid a situation where the joint controller primarily responsible for establishing means and purposes contractually distributes obligations to the other joint controller that the latter could not possibly comply with.
As for the relevance of these findings under the GDPR, all the “joint controllership” part of the judgment is very likely to remain relevant, considering that the language the Court interpreted from Directive 95/46 is very similar to the language used in the GDPR (see Article 2(d) of the Directive and Article 4(7) GDPR). However, the GDPR does add a level of complexity to the situation of joint controllers, in Article 26. The Court could, eventually, add to this jurisprudence an analysis of the extent to which the joint controllership agreement required by Article 26 is relevant to establish the level of responsibility of a joint controller.
Given that the GDPR requires joint controllers to determine in a transparent manner their respective responsibilities for compliance through an arrangement, one consequence of the judgment is that such an arrangement should be concluded between Facebook and fan page administrators (Article 26(1) GDPR). The essence of the arrangement must then be made available to visitors of fan pages (Article 26(2) GDPR).
However, there is one obligation under the GDPR that, when read together with the findings of the Court, results in a conundrum. Article 26(3) GDPR provides that the data subject may exercise his or her rights “in respect of and against each of the controller”, regardless of how the responsibility is shared contractually between them. In the case at hand, the Court acknowledges that the administrator only has access to anonymized data. This means that even if data subjects would make, for example, a request for access or erasure of data to the administrator, it will not be in a position to solve such requests. A possibility is that any requests made to a joint controller that does not have access to data will be forwarded by the latter to the joint controller that does have access (what is important is that the data subject has a point of contact and eventually someone they can claim their rights to). This is yet another reason why a written agreement to establish the responsibility of each joint controller is useful. Practice will solve the conundrum, ultimately, with DPAs and national Courts likely playing their part.
[1] “(d) ‘controller’ shall mean the natural or legal person, public authority, agency or any other body which alone or jointly with others determines the purposes and means of the processing of personal data; where the purposes and means of processing are determined by national or Community laws or regulations, the controller or the specific criteria for his nomination may be designated by national or Community law;”
Exam scripts are partly personal data and other practical findings of the CJEU in Nowak
The Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) gave its judgment in Case C-434/16 Nowak on 20 December 2017, and it is significant from several points of view:
This comment looks closer at all of these findings.
Facts of the Case
Mr Nowak was a trainee accountant who requested access to his exam script from the Institute of Chartered Accountants of Ireland (CAI), after failing the examination. He first challenged the results of the exam with no success. He then submitted a subject access request to the CAI, asking to receive a copy of all his personal data held by the CAI. He obtained 17 documents, but the exam script was not among them.
Mr Nowak brought this to the attention of the Irish Data Protection Commissioner (DPC) through an email, arguing that his exam script was also his personal data. The DPC answered by email that exam scripts “would not generally constitute personal data”. Mr Nowak submitted then a formal complaint with the DPC against the CAI. The official response of the DPC was to reject the complaint on the ground that it is “frivolous or vexatious” (the same reason used to reject the first complaint of Max Schrems challenging the EU-US Safe Harbor scheme).
Mr Nowak then challenged this decision of the Irish DPC in front of the Circuit Court, then the High Court and then the Court of Appeal, which all decided against him. Finally, he challenged the decision of the Court of Appeal at the Supreme Court who decided to stay proceedings and send questions for a preliminary ruling to the CJEU, since the case required interpretation of EU law – in particular, how should the concept of “personal data” as provided for by EU Directive 95/46 be interpreted (a small procedural reminder here: Courts of last instance are under an obligation to send questions for a preliminary ruling to the CJEU in all cases that require the interpretation of EU law, per Article 267 TFEU last paragraph).
Questions referred
The Supreme Court asked the CJEU two questions (in summary):
Pseudonymised data is personal data
First, recalling its Breyer jurisprudence, the Court establishes that, for information to be treated as personal data, it is of no relevance whether all the information enabling the identification of the data subject is in the hands of one person or whether the identifiers are separated (§31). In this particular case, it is not relevant “whether the examiner can or cannot identify the candidate at the time when he/she is correcting and marking the examination script” (§30).
The Court then looks at the definition of personal data from Directive 95/46, underlying that it has two elements: “any information” and “related to an identified or identifiable natural person”.
“Any information” means literally any information, be it objective or subjective
The Court recalls that the scope of Directive 95/46 is “very wide and the personal data covered … is varied” (§33).
“The use of the expression ‘any information’ in the definition of the concept of ‘personal data’ … reflects the aim of the EU legislature to assign a wide scope to that concept, which is not restricted to information that is sensitive or private, but potentially encompasses all kinds of information, not only objective but also subjective, in the form of opinions and assessments, provided that it ‘relates’ to the data subject.” (§34)
Save this paragraph, as it is a new jurisprudential source of describing what constitutes personal data – it is certainly a good summary, in line with the Court’s previous case-law (see an excellent overview of the Court’s approach to the definition of personal data here, p. 40 – 41). It makes clear that, for instance, comments on social media, reviews of products/companies, ratings and any other subjective assessments are personal data, as long as they relate to an identified or identifiable individual. This is also true for any sort of objective information (think shoe number), regardless of whether it is sensitive or private, as long as it relates to an identified or identifiable individual.
“Related to” must be judged in relation to “content, purpose or effect/consequences”
The condition for any information to be considered personal data is that it relates to a natural person. According to the Court, this means that “by reason of its content, purpose or effect, (it) is linked to a particular person” (§35). The Court thus applies the test developed by the Article 29 Working Party in its 2007 Opinion on the concept of personal data. Ten years ago, the DPAs wrote that “in order to consider that the data ‘relate’ to an individual, a ‘content’ element OR a ‘purpose’ element OR a ‘result’ element should be present” (2007 Opinion, p. 10).
The Court now adopted this test in its case-law, giving an indication of how important the common interpretation given by data protection authorities in official guidance is. However, the Court does not directly refer to the Opinion.
Applying the test to the facts of the case, the Court showed that the content of exam answers “reflects the extent of the candidate’s knowledge and competence in a given field and, in some cases, his intellect, thought processes, and judgment” (§37). Additionally, following AG Kokott’s Opinion, the Court also pointed out that “in the case of a handwritten script, the answers contain, in addition, information as to his handwriting” (§37).
The purpose of the answers is “to evaluate the candidate’s professional abilities and his suitability to practice the profession concerned” (§38) and the consequence of the answers “is liable to have an effect on his or her rights and interests, in that it may determine or influence, for example, the chance of entering the profession aspired to or of obtaining the post sought” (§39).
Comments of reviewers are two times personal data
The test is then applied to the comments of reviewers on the margin of a candidate’s answers. The Court showed that “The content of those comments reflects the opinion or the assessment of the examiner of the individual performance of the candidate in the examination, particularly of his or her knowledge and competences in the field concerned. The purpose of those comments is, moreover, precisely to record the evaluation by the examiner of the candidate’s performance, and those comments are liable to have effects for the candidate” (§43).
It is important to note here that complying with only one of the three criteria (content, purpose, effects) is enough to qualify information as “relating to” an individuals, even if the Court found in this particular case that all of them are met. This is shown by the us of “or” in the enumeration made in §35, as shown above.
The Court also found that “the same information may relate to a number of individuals and may constitute for each of them, provided that those persons are identified or identifiable, personal data” (§45), having regard to the fact that the comments of the examiners are personal data of both the examiners and the “examinee”.
Information can be Personal data regardless of whether one is able to rectify it or not
It was the Irish DPC that argued that qualifying information as “personal data” should be affected by the fact that the consequence of that classification is, in principle, that the candidate has rights of access and rectification (§46). The logic here was that if data cannot be rectified, it cannot be considered personal – just as exam answers cannot be rectified after the exam finished.
The Court (rightfully so) disagreed with this claim, following the opinion of the Advocate General and contradicting its own findings in Case C-141/12 YS (see a more detailed analysis of the interaction between the two judgments below). It argued that “a number of principles and safeguards, provided for by Directive 95/46, are attached to that classification and follow from that classification” (§47), meaning that protecting personal data goes far beyond the ability to access and rectify your data. This finding is followed by a summary of the fundamental mechanisms encompassed by data protection.
Data protection is a web of safeguards, accountability and individual rights
Starting from recital 25 of Directive 95/46 (yet again, how important recitals are! Think here of Recital 4 of the GDPR and the role it can play in future cases – “The processing of personal data should be designed to serve mankind”), the Court stated that:
“…the principles of protection provided for by that directive are reflected, on the one hand, in the obligations imposed on those responsible for processing data, obligations which concern in particular data quality, technical security, notification to the supervisory authority, and the circumstances under which processing can be carried out, and, on the other hand, in the rights conferred on individuals, the data on whom are the subject of processing, to be informed that processing is taking place, to consult the data, to request corrections and even to object to processing in certain circumstances” (§48).
The Court thus looks at data protection as a web of accountability, safeguards (reflected in technical security measures, data quality, conditions for lawful processing data) and rights conferred to the individuals.
In this case, not considering exam answers personal data just because they cannot be “corrected” after the exam would strip this information from the other web of protections, such as being processed on a legitimate ground, being retained only for the necessary period of time and so on. The Court does not phrase this finding this way, but it states that:
“Accordingly, if information relating to a candidate, contained in his or her answers submitted at a professional examination and in the comments made by the examiner with respect to those answers, were not to be classified as ‘personal data’, that would have the effect of entirely excluding that information from the obligation to comply not only with the principles and safeguards that must be observed in the area of personal data protection, and, in particular, the principles relating to the quality of such data and the criteria for making data processing legitimate, established in Articles 6 and 7 of Directive 95/46, but also with the rights of access, rectification and objection of the data subject, provided for in Articles 12 and 14 of that directive, and with the supervision exercised by the supervisory authority under Article 28 of that directive” (§49).
Furthermore, the Court shows that errors in the answers given to an exam do not constitute “inaccuracy” of personal data, because the level of knowledge of a candidate is revealed precisely by the errors in his or her answers, and revealing the level of knowledge is the purpose of this particular data processing. As the Court explains, “[i]t is apparent from Article 6(1)(d) of Directive 95/46 that the assessment of whether personal data is accurate and complete must be made in the light of the purpose for which that data was collected” (§53).
Exam scripts should only be kept in an identifiable form as long as they can be challenged
The Court further explained that both exam answers and reviewers’ comments can nevertheless be subject to “inaccuracy” in a data protection sense, “for example due to the fact that, by mistake, the examination scripts were mixed up in such a way that the answers of another candidate were ascribed to the candidate concerned, or that some of the cover sheets containing the answers of that candidate are lost, so that those answers are incomplete, or that any comments made by an examiner do not accurately record the examiner’s evaluation of the answers of the candidate concerned” (§54).
Also, the Court also admitted the possibility that “a candidate may, under Article 12(b) of Directive 95/46, have the right to ask the data controller to ensure that his examination answers and the examiner’s comments with respect to them are, after a certain period of time, erased, that is to say, destroyed” (§55).
Another finding of the Court that will be useful to schools, universities and other educational institutions is that keeping exam scripts related to an identifiable individual is not necessary anymore after the examination procedure is closed and can no longer be challenged: “Taking into consideration the purpose of the answers submitted by an examination candidate and of the examiner’s comments with respect to those answers, their retention in a form permitting the identification of the candidate is, a priori, no longer necessary as soon as the examination procedure is finally closed and can no longer be challenged, so that those answers and comments have lost any probative value” (§55).
The Court distances itself from the findings in C-141/12 YS, but still wants to keep that jurisprudence alive
One of the biggest questions surrounding the judgment in Nowak was whether the Court will follow AG’s Opinion and change it’s jurisprudence from C-141/12 YS. In that judgment, the Court found that the legal analysis used by the Dutch Ministry of Immigration in a specific case of asylum seekers is not personal data, and the main reason invoked was that “[i]n contrast to the data relating to the applicant for a residence permit which is in the minute and which may constitute the factual basis of the legal analysis contained therein, such an analysis … is not in itself liable to be the subject of a check of its accuracy by that applicant and a rectification under Article 12(b) of Directive 95/46” (§45).
The Court further noted: “In those circumstances, extending the right of access of the applicant for a residence permit to that legal analysis would not in fact serve the directive’s purpose of guaranteeing the protection of the applicant’s right to privacy with regard to the processing of data relating to him, but would serve the purpose of guaranteeing him a right of access to administrative documents, which is not however covered by Directive 95/46.” Finally, the finding was that “[i]t follows from all the foregoing considerations … that the data relating to the applicant for a residence permit contained in the minute and, where relevant, the data in the legal analysis contained in the minute are ‘personal data’ within the meaning of that provision, whereas, by contrast, that analysis cannot in itself be so classified” (§48).
Essentially, in YS the Court linked the ability of accessing and correcting personal data with the classification of information as personal data, finding that if the information cannot be corrected, then it cannot be accessed and it cannot be classified as personal data.
By contrast, following AG Kokott’s analysis, in Nowak the Court essentially states that classifying information as personal data must not be affected by the existence of the rights to access and rectification – in the sense that the possibility to effectively invoke them should not play a role in establishing that certain information is or is not personal data: “the question whether written answers submitted by a candidate at a professional examination and any comments made by an examiner with respect to those answers should be classified as personal data cannot be affected … by the fact that the consequence of that classification is, in principle, that the candidate has rights of access and rectification, pursuant to Article 12(a) and (b) of Directive 95/46” (§46).
However, the Court is certainly not ready to fully change its jurisprudence established in YS, and even refers to its judgment in YS in a couple of paragraphs. In the last paragraphs of Nowak, the Court links the ability to correct or erase data to the existence of the right of accessing that data (but not to classifying information as personal data).
The Court states that: “In so far as the written answers submitted by a candidate at a professional examination and any comments made by an examiner with respect to those answers are therefore liable to be checked for, in particular, their accuracy and the need for their retention… and may be subject to rectification or erasure…, the Court must hold that to give a candidate a right of access to those answers and to those comments… serves the purpose of that directive of guaranteeing the protection of that candidate’s right to privacy with regard to the processing of data relating to him (see, a contrario, judgment of 17 July 2014, YS and Others, C‑141/12 and C‑372/12, EU:C:2014:2081, paragraphs 45 and 46), irrespective of whether that candidate does or does not also have such a right of access under the national legislation applicable to the examination procedure”.
After previously showing an ever deeper understanding of data protection in its Nowak judgment, the Court sticks to some of its findings from YS, even if this meant perpetuating a confusion between the fundamental right to respect for private life and the fundamental right to the protection of personal data: “it must be recalled that the protection of the fundamental right to respect for private life means, inter alia, that any individual may be certain that the personal data relating to him is correct and that it is processed in a lawful manner” (§57 in Nowak and §44 in YS). Lawful processing of personal data and the right to keep personal data accurate are, in fact, enshrined in Article 8 of the EU Charter – the right to the protection of personal data, and not in Article 7 – the right to respect for private life.
Obiter dictum 1: the curious insertion of “exam questions” in the equation
The Court also does something curious in these last paragraphs. It simply states, after the paragraphs sending to the YS judgment, that “the rights of access and rectification, under Article 12(a) and (b) of Directive 95/46, do not extend to the examination questions, which do not as such constitute the candidate’s personal data” (§58). The national court did not ask about this specific point. AG Kokott also does not address this issue at all in her Opinion. This might have been raised during the hearing, but no context is provided to it. The Court simply states that “Last, it must be said…” and follows it with the finding regarding test questions.
While it is easy to see that questions of a specific test, by themselves, are not personal data, as they do not relate with regard to their content, purpose or effect to a specific individual, the situation is not as clear when the questions are part of the “solved” exam sheet of a specific candidate. The question is: “Are the answers of the test inextricably linked to the questions?” Imagine a multiple choice test, where the candidate only gains access to his/her answers, without obtaining access to the questions of that test. Accessing the answers would be unintelligible. For instance, EPSO candidates have been trying for years to access their own exam sheets held by the EPSO agency of the European Union, with no success. This is exactly because EPSO only provides access to the series of letters chosen as answers from the multiple choice test. Challenges of this practice have all failed, including those brought to the attention of the former Civil Service Tribunal of the CJEU (see this case, for example). This particular finding in Nowak closes the barely opened door for EPSO candidates to finally have access to their whole test sheet.
Obiter dictum 2: reminding Member States they can restrict the right of access
With an apparent reason and referring to the GDPR, the CJEU recalls, as another obiter dictum, under the same “it must be said” (§58 and §59), that both Directive 95/46 and the GDPR “provide for certain restrictions of those rights” (§59) – access, erasure etc.
It also specifically refers to grounds that can be invoked by Member States when limiting the right to access under the GDPR: when such a restriction constitutes a necessary measure to safeguard the rights and freedoms of others (§60,§61), or if it is done for other objectives of general public interest of the Union or of a Member State (§61).
These findings are not followed by any other considerations, as the Court concludes with a finding that had already been reached around §50: “the answer to the questions referred is that Article 2(a) of Directive 95/46 must be interpreted as meaning that, in circumstances such as those of the main proceedings, the written answers submitted by a candidate at a professional examination and any comments made by an examiner with respect to those answers constitute personal data, within the meaning of that provision” (§62).
If you want to have a look at a summary of AG Kokott’s excellent Conclusions in this case and then compare them to the judgment of the Court, click here. The Court did follow the Conclusions to a great extent.
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Posted in CJEU case-law, Comments
Tagged data protection, definition of personal data, exam scripts, GDPR and education, Irish Data Protection Commissioner, Nowak, personal data, retention period of tests, right to access your own exam, right to erasure, right to obtain a copy of a test